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1 Introduction
Monopolistic competition has been used successfully in a wide range of fields, including economic growth
and development, international trade, and economic geography. Although the CES utility model has
been the workhorse of the vast majority of contributions based on monopolistic competition, it is fair
to say that this model suﬀers from major drawbacks. First, individual preferences lack flexibility since
the elasticity of substitution is constant and the same across varieties. Second, the market outcome is
not directly aﬀected by the entry of new firms. In particular, markups and prices are independent from
the number of competitors. This runs against empirical evidence, which suggests that firms operating in
bigger markets have lower markups (Syverson, 2007). Third, there is no scale eﬀect, that is, the size of
firms is independent of the number of consumers, which contradicts the fact that firms tend to be larger in
larger markets (Campbell and Hopenhayn, 2005). Fourth, and last, firms’ price and size are independent
from the geographical distribution of demand. Yet, it is well documented that firms benefit from being
closer to their larger markets, while distance accounts for more than half of the overall diﬀerence between
large plant and small plant shipments (Head and Mayer, 2004; Holmes and Stevens, 2010).
Thus, we find it both meaningful and important to develop a more general model of monopolistic
competition. The CES must be a special case of our setting to assess how our results depart from those
obtained under the CES. Moreover, in order to provide a better description of real world markets than
the CES, our setting must also be able to cope with issues highlighted in oligopoly theory, such as the
impact of entry and market size on prices and firm size. Developing such a general model and studying
the properties of the market equilibrium is the main objective of this paper. To achieve our goal, we
assume that preferences over the diﬀerentiated product are additively separable across varieties. However,
unlike Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) who work mainly with a power function, we derive the properties of the
market outcome for a general and unspecified utility function. Though still restrictive, we will see that
additive preferences are rich enough to describe a range of market outcomes much wider than the CES. In
particular, this setting will allow us to deal with various patterns of substitution through the relative love
for variety. When consumption is the same across varieties, the relative love for variety is the inverse of
the elasticity of substitution across varieties. Thus, unlike the CES, the degree of product diﬀerentiation
is endogenous in our setting.
Though ignoring explicit strategic interactions, our general equilibrium model of monopolistic com-
petition is suﬃciently rich (i) to display several eﬀects highlighted in industrial organization and (ii) to
uncover new results under general and well-behaved utility functions, which have empirical appeal. Spe-
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cifically, we will show that the market outcome depends on how the relative love of variety varies with the
consumption level. To be precise, the market outcome may obey two opposite patterns. On the one hand,
when the relative love for variety increases with individual consumption, the equilibrium displays the
standard pro-competitive eﬀects generated by the entry of new firms and a larger market size, two eﬀects
that the CES does not capture: more firms, a larger market size, or both lead to lower market prices. On
the other hand, when the relative love for variety decreases, the market generates anti-competitive eﬀects,
that is, a larger number of firms, a bigger market, or both lead to higher prices. Although at odds with the
standard paradigm of entry, this result agrees with several recent contributions in industrial organization
(Amir and Lambson, 2000; Chen and Riordan, 2007, 2008) as well as with empirical studies showing that
entry or economic integration may lead to higher markups (Ward et al., 2002; Badinger, 2007). It should
not be viewed, therefore, as an exotica. In other words, our paper adds to the literature the idea that what
looks like an anti-competitive outcome need not be driven by defence or collusive strategies: it may result
from the nature of preferences with well-behaved utility functions. In addition, although the majority of
industrial sectors is likely to display pro-competitive outcomes, we find it reasonable to expect some of
them to mimic anti-competitive behavior. In this respect, our analysis provides a possible rationale for
contrasted results observed in the empirical literature (see also Section 2.3). Last, it is worth stressing
that the relative love for variety need not be monotone, in which case our results are locally valid only. In
this event, the market outcome may display diﬀerent behaviors depending on the consumption level.
We also want to stress that the CES is the dividing line between those two classes of utility functions
since it does not display any of the above-mentioned eﬀects. In addition, we show that our main results can
be extended to a multi-sector economy under fairly mild assumptions on the upper-tier utility. Therefore,
they can be used as an alternative to the CES, which is often used in empirical trade papers. Note
also that our analysis is consistent with the idea that, though most sectors of the economy are probably
pro-competitive, a few may mimic anti-competitive behavior.
Our research strategy has also empirical appeal because it provides theoretical predictions that are
suﬃciently simple to be tested, suﬃciently general to make sense on an empirical level, and precise enough
to allow one to discriminate between diﬀerent explanations. Furthermore, our approach also sheds new
light on models that are commonly used in the empirics of trade. In particular, our analysis shows
that a single market equilibrium, which leads to a specific value of the elasticity of substitution, can be
rationalized by a CES model yielding this equilibrium. However, this does not mean that the CES can be
used without questioning its relevance in studies comparing several markets and/or periods. Indeed, even
when the CES provides a good approximation of preferences for a particular dataset, one may expect very
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diﬀerent estimates of the elasticity of substitution to be obtained with diﬀerent ones. We need not assume
changing preferences to rationalize this diﬀerence. It is suﬃcient to assume that elasticity of substitution
across varieties varies with the consumption level.
The foregoing analysis has been developed in the case of homogeneous firms. Yet, there is mounting
evidence that firms are heterogeneous in terms of productivity (see, e.g. Bernard et al., 2003). It is,
therefore, natural to ask whether our modeling strategy can cope with heterogeneous firms à la Melitz
(2003). This is what we accomplish in Section 4 where it is shown that both the cutoﬀ cost and markup
decrease (increase) with the size of the market when the relative love for variety increases (decreases)
with individual consumption. Under the same circumstances, the aggregate productivity rises or falls.
All of this is to be contrasted with the CES where the market size has no impact on these variables. We
thus find it fair to say that the distinction between the pro- and anti-competitive cases made above for
homogeneous firms keeps its relevance when firms are heterogeneous. In addition, the results are obtained
for a general distribution of marginal costs. Last, the nature of our main results still holds in a unified
framework that explicitly combines vertical, horizontal and cost heterogeneity.
The idea of additive preferences is not new since it goes back at least to Houtakker (1960), who
introduced this specification precisely because it provides new impetus to empirical analysis. Using the
same preference structure, Spence (1976) and Vives (1999, ch.6) have derived equilibrium conditions
similar to ours. However, their main purpose is diﬀerent from what we accomplish in this paper since
their aim is to compare the free entry equilibrium and the social optimum. Our model also share several
similarities with Krugman (1979) who shows how decreasing demand-elasticity yields what we call pro-
competitive eﬀects. Yet, Krugman did not explore the market implications of his model, perhaps because
his purpose was diﬀerent from ours. His approach has been ignored in subsequent works by trade theorists.
As observed by Neary (2004, p.177), this is probably because Krugman’s specification of preferences “has
not proved tractable, and from Dixit and Norman (1980) and Krugman (1980) onwards, most writers
have used the CES specification.” Instead, we show that Krugman’s approach is tractable. To be precise,
we can provide a complete characterization of the market outcome and of all the comparative statics
implications in terms prices, consumption level, outputs, and mass of firms/varieties.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model in the case of a one-sector
economy. We characterize the market equilibrium when (i) the mass of firms is exogenous and (ii) the
mass of firms is determined by free entry and exit. In Section 3, our results are extended to a multi-sector
economy. In Section 4, we apply our approach to the case of heterogeneous firms and show that the
behavior of the relative love for variety is critical for the determination of the cutoﬀ cost, thereby for the
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average productivity of the industry. Section 5 shows how our modeling strategy can be extended to the
case of non-additive utilities such as the quadratic and the translog. Section 6 concludes.1
2 The one-sector economy
2.1 The model
The economy involves one diﬀerentiated good and one production factor - labor. There are  workers
and each supplies  eﬃciency units of labor. The unit of labor is chosen as the numéraire so that 
is both a worker’s income and expenditure. The diﬀerentiated good is made available as a continuum
 of horizontally diﬀerentiated varieties indexed by  ∈ [0 ]. They are provided by monopolistically
competitive (hereafter, MC) firms. Each firm produces a single variety and no two firms sell the same
variety. To operate every firm needs a fixed requirement   0 and a marginal requirement   0 of labor,
so that the production cost of a firm supplying the quantity  is equal to  + .
Preferences. Consumers’ preferences are additively separable. Given a (measurable) price function
p = ≤ and an expenditure value , every consumer chooses a (measurable) consumption function
x = ≤ to maximize her utility subject to the budget constraint:
max() U ≡
Z 
0
()d s.t.
Z 
0
d = 
where (·) is a thrice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave function.2
The assumptions made on the utility  imply that consumers are variety-lovers. Let   0 be any
given quantity of the diﬀerentiated good. If a consumer owns the same number  units of each variety
 ∈ [0 ] with    , she enjoys the utility level given by U(;) = () + ( − )(0). Note
that (0) 6= 0 implies that increasing the number of varieties aﬀects the consumer’s well-being even when
she does not change the range of varieties she consumes. This does not strike us as being plausible. For
this reason, we assume from now on that (0) = 0. That said, it is readily verified that () is a
strictly increasing function of . Consequently, rather than concentrating her consumption over a small
mass of varieties, the consumer prefers to spread it over the whole range of available varieties ( = ).
Furthermore, since the second derivative of () with respect to  is negative, a consumer values
variety at a decreasing rate.
1After completion of this paper, Kristian Behrens brought to our attention the paper by Bertoletti et al. (2008). Their
analysis starts from the same premises us but falls short of what we accomplish here.
2We do not include firms’ profits into the budget constraint because total profits are zero when the mass of firms is
determined by free entry. Furthermore, being negligible to the market, a firm cannot manipulate aggregate profits.
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All of this has the following implication: individual consumption in the theory of monopolistic compet-
ition with love for variety is formally equivalent to individual decision-making in the Arrow-Pratt theory
of risk aversion, the mix of risky assets being replaced with the mix of diﬀerentiated varieties. This
will allow us to derive properties of firms’ demands that are both intuitive and simple. More precisely,
the key-concept for our study of monopolistic competition is what we call the relative love for variety
(hereafter, RLV), which is invariant under a linear transformation of  (recall that (0) = 0):
() ≡ −
00()
0()  0 (1)
Under the CES, we have () =  where  is a constant such that 0   ≤ 1, thus implying a
constant RLV given by 1 − . Another example is Behrens and Murata (2007) who retain the CARA
utility () = 1− exp(−) where   0 is the absolute love for variety. Thus, the corresponding RLV,
given by , increases with the consumption level.
To better understand the economic meaning of the RLV, it turns out to be useful to evaluate it along
the diagonal in the quantity space ( = ). Using the definition of the elasticity of substitution  (Nadiri,
1982, p.442), we obtain
() = 1()  (2)
Thus, at a symmetric consumption pattern, the RLV is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution across
varieties. However, unlike the CES where the elasticity of substitution is exogenous and constant, the value
of  varies here with the consumption level  or, equivalently, with the price level and the mass of varieties,
as in the translog utility (Feenstra, 2003). In other words, a higher consumption of the diﬀerentiated
product makes consumers’ love for variety stronger (weaker) when the RLV is increasing (decreasing). This
is because consumers’ preferences for more balanced bundles of varieties become stronger (weaker). Both
schemes seem a priori plausible, which means that it is hard to make predictions about the behavior of the
RLV without appealing to empirical studies. On the other hand, (2) ceases to hold when the consumption
pattern is asymmetric because the expression for the elasticity of substitution is more involved.
Last, observe that additive preferences with (0) = 0 are (globally) homothetic if and only if () = .
By using a general utility function , we thus obviate one of the main pitfalls encountered in many
applications of the CES.
Demand. To determine the equilibrium consumption, we diﬀerentiate the Lagrangian
U + 
µ
 −
Z 
0
d
¶
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with respect to  and get
0() =  (3)
where the Lagrange multiplier
 =
R 
0 0()d

varies with the consumption function (·), the mass of varieties  , and the expenditure . In other
words, the marginal utility of income is the aggregate statistic that matters to consumers and firms, very
much as the price index does in the Dixit-Stiglitz model.
Clearly,
() = 0() (4)
is the inverse demand function. Because the Lagrange multiplier acts only as a scaling factor, this
expression implies that the inverse demand and the marginal utility display the same properties. In
particular, () is strictly decreasing in . Note that the willingness-to-pay for a variety depends on
the consumption levels of the other varieties through the value of . Unlike Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), we
do not assume that  takes a specific functional form.
It is readily verified that the price-elasticity of demand for a variety is equal to the inverse of the RLV
evaluated at the consumption level:
() ≡ −

 =
1
[()]  (5)
Therefore, a stronger (weaker) love for variety generates less (more) elastic demands. This is because a
stronger love for variety induces consumers to focus more on a balanced mix of varieties, which in turn
makes the demands for these varieties less sensitive to changes in their relative prices. This relationship
builds the link with Krugman (1979) who assumes the price-elasticity to be decreasing, i.e. the RLV to
be upward sloping.
Since there is a continuum of varieties, the consumption level of variety  has a negligible impact on
a consumer’s utility, which implies that changing variety ’s price does not aﬀect the demand for variety
 6= . As a result, the cross-price elasticity of demand for a variety is zero, and thus this demand depends
only upon the variety price and the marginal utility of income. Furthermore, (2) and (5) imply that,
along the diagonal in the quantity space, the elasticity of substitution among varieties is equal to the
price-elasticity of a variety’s demand, as in the CES case (Vives, 1999). However, unlike the CES, this
relationship ceases to hold oﬀ-diagonal, while both  and  vary with the common consumption level .
7
Producers. Since all consumers face the same multiplier, the functional form of the demand for
variety  is the same across consumers, which implies that the market demand is given by . Being
negligible to the market, each firm accurately treats  as a parameter. However, as shown by (4), for
choosing its profit-maximizing output it must anticipate the equilibrium value of . Having done this,
a firm behaves like a monopolist on its market, and thus maximizing profits with respect to price or
quantity yields the same equilibrium outcome.
The marginal production cost  is identical across firms. Admittedly, this assumption simplifies our
analysis because it allows us to focus on a symmetric market outcome. Therefore, one may legitimately
ask how our setting can accommodate heterogeneous firms à la Melitz (2003). We address the case of
heterogeneous firms in Section 4
Using (4), the producer’s program is as follows:
max (;(·)) =
∙0()
(·) − 
¸
 − 
For any given , the first-order condition may be rewritten as follows:
0() + 00() =  (6)
where  stands for the consumption level of any variety. If the conditions
lim→0[
0() + 00()] =∞ lim→∞[
0() + 00()] ≤ 0 (7)
hold, then the intermediate value theorem implies that (6) has a positive solution.3 Furthermore, if a
firm’s profit function  is strictly concave, (6) has a unique solution and this one is a profit-maximizer.
The strict concavity of  is equivalent to
0() = −
000()
00()  2 (8)
In words, this condition implies that (inverse) demands are not “too” convex.
We make an additional mild assumption on utility. It is well known that the strict concavity of profits
means that the marginal revenue is strictly decreasing. Consequently, two cases may arise. First, the
3Conditions (7) are not necessary for our results to hold. For example, the first condition in (7) is made to guarantee the
existence of a positive equilibrium consumption for all  values, a very demanding condition. One of the examples discussed
below (1 = 2√+ 1− 2) does not satisfy (7), but all our results hold true for this utility function.
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equation 0() + 00() = 0 has no solution. Using (7), it must be that () is smaller than 1 for all
  0. Second, 0() + 00() = 0 has a solution 0, which is unique. In this event, we have ()  1
for   0 and ()  1 for   0. Therefore, we may restrict ourselves to the interval (0 0) since
the equilibrium belongs to (0 0). Without loss of generality, we may then assume that ()  1 for all
relevant values of   0. To rule out the possibility of a market outcome in which firms sell an arbitrarily
small quantity at an arbitrarily high price, we assume (0)  1. In sum,
()  1 for all  ≥ 0 (9)
Therefore, at a symmetric equilibrium the elasticity of substitution exceeds 1. Throughout the rest of
this paper, we assume that conditions (7)-(9) are satisfied.
To disentangle the various eﬀects at work, it is both relevant and convenient to distinguish between
what we call a short-run equilibrium, in which the mass  of firms is fixed, and a long-run equilibrium
in the which the mass of firms is endogenously determined through free entry and exit. Because the
short-run analysis is an intermediate step in the study of the long-run equilibrium where profits are zero,
we do not address the impact of the redistribution of profits.
2.2 The short-run equilibrium
Let  ≡  be firm ’s output. Given the mass  of firms, ¯≤ is a short-run equilibrium if no firm
finds it profitable to change unilaterally its output while anticipating accurately the value of . For any
given , (8) implies that (6) has a single solution ¯. Since all firms face the same Lagrange multiplier, the
solutions to these first-order conditions are the same across firms, i.e.  = ¯ for (almost) all  ∈ [0  ].
Thus, if a short-run equilibrium exists, it must be symmetric. It is denoted by ¯ = ¯(). Let ¯ be the
resulting equilibrium price.
It is readily verified that the first-order condition for firm ’s profit maximization may be written as
follows:
¯ ≡ ¯− ¯ = (¯) (10)
Hence, in equilibrium, the markup of a firm is equal to the RLV. Since (¯)  1, the elasticity of
substitution must exceed 1 at any symmetric equilibrium. Furthermore, the budget constraint implies
that the two equilibrium conditions are given by
¯ = 
1−  (¯) ¯ =

¯ (11)
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The existence and uniqueness of a short-run equilibrium are established in Appendix A.
The impact of  . Diﬀerentiating the equilibrium condition (11) with respect to  leads to the
expression
¯
 = −
0
(1− )2
µ 
2¯ +

¯2
¶ ¯
 
Multiplying this expression by ¯ and using ¯ = ¯ yields after rearrangements
(1−  + ¯0)¯
¯
 = −¯
0 (12)
It follows from (A.1) in Appendix 1 that 1− + ¯0  0. Therefore, (12) implies that ¯ and 0(¯)
have opposite signs. Consequently, we have:
Proposition 1 If (7)-(9) hold, then there exists a unique and symmetric short-run equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, when the relative love for variety increases (decreases) with the consumption level, then the
equilibrium price decreases (increases) with the mass of firms. The equilibrium price is independent of the
mass of firms if and only if the utility is given by a CES.
To understand the intuition behind this proposition, note that the equilibrium consumption of each
variety decreases with  because expenditure is distributed over a wider range of varieties, while price
change do not outweigh this impact. More precisely, since   1, it follows from (12) that the elasticity
of ¯ with respect to  exceeds −1. Diﬀerentiating the equilibrium condition ¯ = ¯ with respect to
 then implies that ¯ decreases.
We are now equipped to discuss the results of Proposition 1. When the RLV increases with the
consumption level, the entry of new firms leads to a lower equilibrium price. This is the standard pro-
competitive eﬀect generated by entry, which works here as follows. Since the individual consumption level
¯ decreases with  , (¯) also decreases, thereby raising the elasticity of substitution (¯). Varieties are
then better substitutes after entry, which makes the market more competitive and yields lower prices. In
this event, preferences generates a pro-competitive eﬀect. By contrast, when the RLV decreases with the
consumption level, the entry of new firms leads to a price hike. In other words, though firms behave non-
cooperatively, preferences are such that the market gives rise to an anti-competitive eﬀect. This unexpected
result can be explained by reversing the above argument. Because the individual consumption decreases
with  , entry now decreases the value of (¯), and thus varieties become more diﬀerentiated. The market
is, therefore, less competitive, which results in a higher market price. The CES is the only function that
has a constant RLV. Consequently, the CES is the only utility for which entry does not impact on the
10
equilibrium price. Hence, we may safely conclude that the CES is the borderline between two diﬀerent
classes of utility functions, which give rise to pro- or anti-competitive eﬀects. Intuitively, entry shifts
down demands but the eﬀect on price is ambiguous. Specifically, it depends on demand’s curvature or,
equivalently, on the behavior of the elasticity, which is here equal to the RLV. According to Proposition
1, whether the market mimics pro- or anti-competitive behaviors depends on the curvature of varieties’
demand relative to the curvature of the CES-demand.
To illustrate, consider the class of “generalized Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion” utility functions:
() = 1 [(+ )
 − ] +  (13)
where  ≥ 0,   0,  ≥ 0, and 0    1. This expression boils down to the CES for  =  = 0. Setting
(i)  = 1,  = 1,  = 0,  = 12, and (ii)  = 0,  = 1,  = 1,  = 12 in (13), we get
1() = 2√+ 1− 2 2() = 2√+ 
which imply
1() = 12(1 + 1) 2() =
1
2(1 +
√) 
Clearly, 1() increases with  whereas the 2() decreases, which means that the market outcome is
pro-competitive under 1 and anti-competitive under 2. For simplicity, we have chosen to express the
equilibrium prices through their inverse (¯) for  = 1 2 in which  is normalized to 1. Under 1, we
have
(¯1) = 2− ¯1
2¯1(¯1 − )
which is decreasing in ¯1 over ( 2), so that ¯1() also decreases with  . Under 2, we obtain
(¯2) = 4(¯2 − )
2
¯2(¯2 − 2)2
which is also defined over ( 2). Diﬀerentiating this expression shows that (¯2) is increasing on this
interval, whence ¯2 increases with  .
2.3 The long-run equilibrium
A symmetric long-run equilibrium is defined by a mass of firm ¯ and a symmetric equilibrium ¯ such
that firms earn zero profits:
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(¯− )¯ =  (14)
This shows that the equilibrium outcome depends on the “relative” market size ˜ ≡  , so that com-
parative statics in terms of ˜ allows one to capture shocks in both population and technology. Using (14)
and the budget constraint, we obtain

¯ =

¯ =
1
˜¯ 
Using this expression and (10) yields the equilibrium consumption of each variety:
¯ = 1˜
µ
1
¯ − 1
¶
 (15)
Furthermore, The conditions for a long-run equilibrium may then be written as follows.
Proposition 2 Every symmetric long-run equilibrium must satisfy the following two conditions:
¯ = 
∙
1
˜
µ
1
¯ − 1
¶¸
(16)
¯ =  ˜¯ (17)
The existence and uniqueness of a long-run equilibrium under (7)-(9) can be proved as in Section 2.2.
In particular, since the equilibrium markup is bounded, the equilibrium mass of firms is always finite. To
illustrate, we return to the utilities 1 and 2 used the above examples and determine the corresponding
markups:
¯1 = 2p
8˜+ 1 + 3 ¯2 =
1
2
Ã
1− 1p˜+ 1
!

It is readily verified that ¯1 and ¯2, respectively, decrease and increase with ˜.
2.3.1 The impact of cost and market size
Markup. Totally diﬀerentiating (16) with respect to ˜ =  , solving for ¯˜ and multiplying both
sides by ˜¯ , we obtain the elasticity:
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E¯˜ ≡ ˜¯
¯
˜ = −
¯
 + 0˜
0 = − ¯ (1− )(1− ) + 0¯
0 = − ¯ (1− )(2− 0)  
0 (18)
=
¯(¯ − 1)
(2− 0)  
0 = (¯ − 1)1 +  − 02− 0  ¯ − 1 (19)
where we have used successively (15), (16), the identity 0 ≡ (1 +  − 0), (12), and (9).
Using (16) yields the elasticities
E¯˜ ≡ ˜¯
¯
˜ =

¯
¯
 = −

¯
¯
 =

¯
¯
 ≡ E¯ (20)
Since   1 and 0  2, it follows from (18) that ¯˜ and 0 have opposite signs. Therefore, as in
Section 2.2, three cases may arise according to the sign of 0. For example, when 0  0, the equilibrium
markup decreases with ˜. As a result, the equilibrium price falls when the population size  increases,
the level of fixed cost  decreases, or both. These eﬀects are expected because a larger  or a smaller 
fosters entry, which here leads to a lower market price. This corresponds to the standard pro-competitive
eﬀect generated by a bigger market. In contrast, when 0  0, we fall back on the anti-competitive eﬀect
uncovered in the above section.
We show in Appendix B that a higher marginal cost always leads to a higher price. In addition, 0  0
(0  0) implies that a higher marginal cost leads to a less (more) than proportional increase in market
price. In other words, the pass-on varies with the RLV.
Industry size. To study how the size of the MC-sector changes with ˜, we diﬀerentiate the equilib-
rium condition (17). Using (19), we then obtain
˜
¯
¯
˜ = 1 +
˜
¯
¯
˜  ¯  0
Hence, regardless of the sign of 0, the equilibrium mass of firms is always an increasing function of the
size of the economy. Thus, the RLV does not aﬀect the pro-entry eﬀect generated by a larger market.
However, it aﬀects the way this pro-entry eﬀect reacts to market size: the above elasticity is smaller
than 1 if and only if 0  0, which means that ¯() grows at a decreasing rate. In other words, when
consumers display an increasing (decreasing) RLV, a growing population enjoy a larger but less (more)
than proportionate mass of varieties. As it should now be expected, the mass of varieties grows linearly
with  if and only if the utility is given by the CES.
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How does ¯ react to the cost parameters? Since increasing  is tantamount to decreasing ˜, ¯ must
decrease with  . Furthermore, as shown in Appendix B, a higher marginal cost leads to a larger mass of
firms if and only if 0  0.
Consumption and output. The impact of the above parameters on ¯ and ¯ can be obtained in a
similar way by diﬀerentiating the corresponding equilibrium conditions (see Appendix B for more details).
It is worth to single out two results. First, the consumption of each variety always falls when the size of
the economy rises, the reason being that consumers prefer to spread their consumption over the wider
range of varieties that results from the entry of new firms. Second, despite the larger mass of competitors,
a growing population induces each firm to produce more if and only if the RLV is increasing. Again, this
is because the entry of new firms leads to a lower market price.
2.3.2 Synthesis
Our results may be summarized in the following two propositions.
Proposition 3 The impact of the relative market size e ≡  on the symmetric long-run equilibrium
is as follows:
0()  0 0() = 0 0()  0
E¯˜ ≡ ¯ ¯ ↓ : −¯  E¯˜  0  : E¯˜ = 0 ↑ : 0  E¯˜
E¯˜ ≡ ¯ ¯ ↑ : 0  E¯˜  1 ↑ : E¯˜ = 1 ↑ : 1  E¯˜
E¯˜ ≡ ¯ ¯ ↓ : −1  E¯˜  0 ↓ : E¯˜ = −1 ↓ : E¯˜  −1
E¯˜ ≡ ¯ ¯ ↑ : 0  E¯˜  1  : E¯˜ = 0 ↓ : E¯˜  0
Again, we see that what determines the properties of the market outcome is the variety-loving attitude
of consumers. That said, the following comments are in order. First, regarding the impact of the relative
market size on the equilibrium price, it is worth noting that the long-run equilibrium inherits the pro- and
anti-competitive properties of the short-run equilibrium. To understand why, we observe that the size ¯
of the industry always grows with . Indeed, when there are more consumers, the profits of incumbents
increase, thus attracting new firms. According to the sign of 0, such an entry leads to a lower or higher
market price. When 0  0, the decrease in market price slows down the entry of new firms. However,
since the elasticity of  with respect to  is smaller than 1, this negative feedback eﬀect cannot outweigh
the initial increase in  . Consequently, the market price is established at a level lower than the initial
one. On the contrary, when 0  0, the feedback eﬀect is positive. This further pushes  upward, making
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the elasticity of  bigger than 1, which in turn yields a higher market price. Yet, this price does not
become arbitrarily large because the individual consumption of each variety decreases at a rate exceeding
1. Under the CES, there is no feedback eﬀect because the market price is unaﬀected by the entry of new
firms. Thus, using the CES as a benchmark, when the market size grows, consumers face a smaller range
of varieties and lower prices when they display an increasing RLV. In contrast, the range of varieties is
wider and prices are higher under a decreasing RLV than under the CES.
To shed further light on the role of market size, it is worth investigating how the equilibrium value ¯
of the Lagrange multiplier changes with . It follows immediately from (6) that
¯ = 
0(¯)[1− (¯)]
 =
0(¯) + ¯00(¯)
 
Diﬀerentiating the numerator of this expression and using (8) shows that ¯ strictly decreases with ¯.
Therefore, regardless of , a larger economy generates a higher marginal utility of income. This a priori
unsuspected result may be explained as follows. While consumers buy a large amount of each variety
in a small economy, they buy a smaller amount in a large economy because they face a wider range of
varieties. This lower consumption makes income more valuable in the large economy than in the small
one.
Another peculiar feature of the CES is that the equilibrium size of firms (¯) is independent of the
market size. Our results show that firms’ size increases in the pro-competitive case. This is because the
industry size grows at a lower pace than the market size while prices go down. On the contrary, firms’
size decreases when the anti-competitive eﬀect prevails because the mass of firms rises at a more than
proportionate rate, while prices go up. These eﬀects combine to yield a lower output. This provides a
possible reconciliation between diverging results in empirical analysis. For example, Holmes and Stevens
(2004) observe that the correlation sign between firm and market sizes diﬀer in services and manufacturing,
whereas Manning (2010) finds a robust correlation between average firm size and total labor market size.
Proposition 3 shows that the sign of the correlation between these two variables depends on the nature
of preferences, and thus may vary across goods as well as with their technology since lowering fixed costs
is equivalent to raising market size.
The impact of marginal cost is less straightforward and is obtained in Appendix B.
Proposition 4 The impact of marginal cost  on the long-run symmetric equilibrium is as follows:
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0()  0 0() = 0 0()  0
E¯ ≡ ¯ ¯ ↑ : 0  1− ¯  E¯  1 ↑ : E¯ = 1 ↑ : 1  E¯
E¯ ≡ ¯ ¯ ↓ : −(1− ¯)  E¯  0  : E¯ = 0 ↑ : 0  E¯
E¯ ≡ ¯ ¯ ↓ : −1  E¯  0 ↓ : E¯ = −1 ↓ : E¯  −1
E¯ ≡ ¯ ¯ ↓ : −1  E¯  0 ↓ : E¯ = −1 ↓ : E¯  −1
Using (18) and (20) when preferences generate pro- (anti-) competitive eﬀects, the markup decreases
(increases) because the market price increases less (more) than proportionally. This in turn fosters the
exit (entry) of firms. Consequently, a technological change aﬀects the degree of diversity in opposite
directions. This discrepancy in results should be useful in empirical studies to distinguish between the
two competition regimes. By contrast, in the CES case, increasing the marginal cost leaves the markup
unchanged.
In addition, under CES preferences, consumers always benefit from a larger market because prices
remain constant while more varieties are available. This positive size eﬀect is reinforced the pro-competitive
eﬀect because prices go down while the market supplies more varieties. Hence consumers are better-oﬀ.
In the anti-competitive case, the impact of market size on welfare is not so clear. Indeed, although more
varieties are still available, they are priced at a higher level. Therefore, if the equilibrium price increases
at a much higher rate than the mass of varieties, one may expect the welfare level to decrease with the
size of the market. And, indeed, we have found well-behaved utility functions such that a growing market
size is detrimental to consumers.
2.3.3 Income and preferences
Assume that consumers have more resources, and thus the individual expenditure is higher. Inspecting
(16) shows that the equilibrium price is independent from . This is because the price-elasticity of a
firm’s demand depends only upon the RLV prevailing in the MC-sector. It then follows from (17) that
the equilibrium mass of firms is an upward-sloping linear function of . In other words, increasing either
 or  leads to a larger mass of firms. Note, however, that the two parameters describing the size of
the sector, i.e.  and , do not play exactly the same role in determining the market outcome: ¯ is
independent of , whereas ¯ varies with .
We now study how the market outcome reacts to a stronger love for variety, that is, the RLV takes
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on a higher value for all  ≥ 0. Let
() ≡ − 
∙
1
˜
µ
1
 − 1
¶¸

be defined on [0 1]. Repeating the argument used to show the existence and uniqueness of a short-run
equilibrium, it is readily verified that () is strictly increasing on [0 1] and such that (0)  0 and
(1)  0, while the equation () = 0 has a single solution. Therefore, when  is shifted upward, ()
moves downward, and thus the equilibrium markup increases. Using (17) shows that the equilibrium mass
of firms also increases. In sum, a stronger love for variety endows firms with more market power, bringing
a higher price and more variety.
Before moving to the case of a multi-sector economy, we want to make a pause and discuss further the
relevance of the CES in empirical works using the monopolistic competitive setting. In equilibrium, the
RLV is equal to the inverse of the elasticity of substitution. Consequently, one can rationalize the use of
the CES once the value of (¯) = 1(¯) evaluated at the market outcome is known. In other words, for
any symmetric long-run equilibrium obtained within our framework, there exists a CES model that yields
the same market outcome. Yet, this does not mean that the CES can be used doubtlessly in empirical
analyses. In order to estimate a model with cross-section or panel dataset, we need data heterogeneity
stemming from variations in the underlying structural parameters such as the relative market size  .
Once we allow for such variations, Proposition 3 tells us that the corresponding elasticity of substitution
also changes, except in the special case in which the real world would be described by the CES. All of
this has the following major implication: it is likely to be meaningless to assume that the elasticity of
substitution is the same across space and/or time (Broda and Weinstein, 2006, and Head and Ries, 2001,
among many others). This should not be interpreted as a negative message, however. Instead, it is our
contention that richer functional forms, which encompasses both pro-and anti-competitive eﬀects, should
be used in empirical analyses. The results in Proposition 3 provide some guidelines that should help
empirical economists in detecting whether or not the market is pro-competitive, thereby helping them to
choose a particular specification. To the very least, we find it fair to say that our analysis gives credence
to such an alternative modeling strategy.
3 The multi-sector economy
Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), we now turn our attention to the case of a two-sector economy involving
a diﬀerentiated good supplied under increasing returns and monopolistic competition, and a homogeneous
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good supplied under constant returns and perfect competition. Labor is the only production factor; it is
perfectly mobile between sectors.
Each individual supplies inelastically one unit of labor and is endowed with preferences defined by
max U ≡ () = 
∙Z 
0
()d 
¸
where  is increasing and strictly concave, while  denotes the consumption of the homogeneous good.
To ensure that both goods  and  are produced at the market outcome, we assume that the marginal
utility of each good tends to infinity when its consumption tends to zero.
Because there is perfect competition and constant returns in the homogeneous good sector, the price
of this good is equal to the equilibrium wage times a constant that measures the marginal productivity
of labor. We then choose the unit of the homogeneous good for this constant to be equal to 1. Last,
choosing the homogeneous good as the numéraire implies that the equilibrium wage is equal to 1 since
the output of this sector is always positive. Since profits are zero, the budget constraint is given by
Z 
0
d+ =  + = 1
where  is now endogenous. The consumer optimization problem may be decomposed in two subproblems,
which in general do not correspond to a two-stage budgeting procedure. First, for any given   1, the
consumer’s program over the diﬀerentiated good is
max
Z 
0
()d s.t.
Z 
0
d = 
As in the previous section, we focus on a symmetric outcome (), so that the optimal value of the
foregoing program is
() ≡ 
µ 

¶

The function  is the indirect utility level derived from consuming the diﬀerentiated good at the symmetric
outcome. It follows from the properties of  that  is decreasing and convex in , increasing in , increasing
and concave in , while the cross-derivatives satisfy 00  0 and 00  0.
Second, the upper-tier maximization problem may be written as follows:
max  (() 1−)
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in which () is the index of the diﬀerentiated good consumption. Let () be the unique solution
to the first-order condition
 01(·)0(·) =  02(·) (21)
evaluated at a symmetric outcome (). Hence, the lower-tier optimization problem becomes
max
Z 
0
()d s.t.
Z 
0
d = ()
Hence, when consumers preferences are described by a general two-tier utility (·), the properties of
 are immaterial for the value of the equilibrium price. To illustrate, consider a Cobb-Douglas utility,
i.e. () =  log+(1−) log. The corresponding expenditure function () may be obtained
as follows. Let  = 0 denote the elasticity of the lower-tier utility  with respect to consumption.
After some manipulations the first-order condition (21) yields
1− 
 =
1−
 
0 =
1−
 (¯)
where ¯ denotes the long-run equilibrium consumption of every variety. Using (15) shows that (¯)
depends only upon ¯, which is itself the unique solution to (16). Therefore, (¯) is independent of  , so
that the equilibrium expenditure on the diﬀerentiated good is defined by
¯(¯) = [(¯)]
(1− )+ [(¯)] 
This expression is tractable enough to be used in comparative static analyses for many specifications of
the lower-tier utility  embodied in a Cobb-Douglas upper-tier utility.
On the other hand, when  is unspecified, it is not possible to derive a closed-form expression for
. However, we are able to derive the main properties of the long-run equilibrium under some mild
assumptions on  and . First, since the equilibrium price ¯, individual consumption ¯ and firm’s output
¯ prevailing in the MC-sector are independent of the value of  (see (16)), their properties still hold
within this general setting.
In contrast, the characterization of the equilibrium mass of varieties is more involved because it
depends on , which now depends on  and . In order to determine the properties of ¯ , we need
some additional assumptions. Working with a specific expenditure function () appears as a relevant
empirical strategy because this function is a priori observable. However, we identify suﬃcient conditions in
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Appendix C for the utilities  and  to yield an expenditure function () that satisfies the following
intuitive properties:
0 ≤  ·

  1

 ·

  1 (22)
The interpretation of these conditions has some appeal. First, the assumption that  and  are com-
plements in preferences ( 0012 ≥ 0) implies that the second and third inequalities hold. Such an assumption
on  is fairly natural in a context in which both  and  refer to composite goods. Furthermore, the first
inequality also implies some form of complementarity, which states that a higher price for the diﬀerenti-
ated good leads consumers to spend more on this good. This agrees with the idea that the consumption of
both  and  decreases because they are poor substitutes. Last, it is worth stressing that the conditions
(22) can be checked once specific utilities are used in empirical analyses.
The following proposition, proven in Appendix D, extends our previous analysis to the case of two
sectors.
Proposition 5 In a two-sector economy, the long-run equilibrium prices, consumption and production
vary with market size and cost parameters as in Proposition 3. Furthermore, if (22) holds, the equilibrium
mass of varieties increases with the relative market size.
It should be clear from the proof that, within a similar modeling structure, the argument developed
above also applies to multi-sector economies with several diﬀerentiated and homogeneous goods.
4 Heterogeneous firms
The assumption of homogeneous firms has vastly simplified the above analysis. We now show that our
modeling strategy can cope with heterogeneous firms à la Melitz (2003) and modify the framework of
Section 2 accordingly. For conciseness, we use the one-period timing proposed by Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008). To ease the burden of notation, we set  = 1.
There are  of potential firms, which each supplies a horizontally diﬀerentiated variety. Prior to
entry, firms face uncertainty about their marginal cost and entry requires a sunk cost . Once the entry
cost  is paid, firms observe their marginal cost drawn randomly from the distribution Γ(), the density
of which is denoted by () defined on [0∞). Last, after observing its type , each entrant decides to
produce or not, given that a firm which chooses to produce incurs a fixed cost  .
Even though varieties are diﬀerentiated from the consumer point of view, firms sharing the same
marginal cost  behave in the same way. As a result, we may refer to any available variety by its -type
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only. Consequently, a consumer’s program may be written as follows:
max()
U ≡ 
Z ˆ
0
()dΓ() s.t. 
Z ˆ
0
dΓ() = 1
where [0 ˆ] is the set of available varieties and  ≥ 0 is the individual consumption of each type -variety.
In the short run, we assume that ˆ is exogenous and such that firms having a marginal cost equal
to ˆ earn zero profits. All operating firms thus have a marginal cost smaller than or equal to ˆ, while
firms having a marginal cost exceeding ˆ do not produce. Hence, the mass of operating firms is given by
Γ(ˆ) ≤  . In the long run, ˆ is endogenously determined by free entry.
4.1 The short-run equilibrium
Demand and supply. The inverse demand function (4) now becomes
() = 0() (23)
which implies that all properties of the demand for variety  studied in Section 2 hold true for (23).
The operating profit of a type -firm is given by
(;) =
∙0()
 − 
¸

Repeating the argument of Section 2.2, we readily verify that the equilibrium condition (11) is replaced
by
¯ = 
1−  (¯) for all  ≤ ˆ (24)
How firms diﬀer. It follows from (23) and (24) that
0(¯)[1− (¯)] =  (25)
Observe that () ≡ 0() [1− ()] is strictly decreasing since its derivative
0() = 200 + 000 = (2− 0)00
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is negative by (8). Therefore, for 1  2 we have
(¯1)
(¯2) =
1
2  1
which implies ¯1  ¯2 , hence ¯1  ¯2 . Since maximum profits always decrease with , regardless of
the behavior of the RLV, in a short-run equilibrium more productive firms have a bigger output, a lower
price, and higher profits than less productive firms.
Using (10), we obtain
¯ = (¯) = 1(¯)  (26)
Therefore, a firm’s markup increases (decreases) with its degree of eﬃciency when the RLV is increasing
(decreasing), so that smaller firms may have higher markups. Unlike the CES, our setting thus allows
for non-constant markups and richer interactions among firms. This is in accordance with what we have
seen in Section 2. Indeed, Appendix B shows that the elasticity of the market price with respect to  is
smaller (larger) than 1 when 0  0 (0  0). Accordingly, the high-productivity firms absorb a higher
(lower) share of a productivity gain than the low-productivity firms. Stated diﬀerently, when the market
mimics pro- (anti-) competitive behavior, a higher degree of eﬃciency allows firms to exploit more (less)
their market power.
This may be explained as follows. Since (¯) measures the elasticity of substitution among type
-varieties, it follows from (26) that the elasticity of substitution is the same within each type but varies
across types. To be precise, consumers view varieties of the same type as equally substitutable, but they
perceive the low-cost varieties as being more (less) diﬀerentiated than the high-cost varieties when the
RLV increases (decreases). Thus, as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) who work with the quadratic utility,
in the pro-competitive case the market price increases whereas the markup decreases with . However,
our analysis reveals the existence of another market configuration: in the anti-competitive case, both the
market price and markup increase with .
4.2 The long-run equilibrium
Using the following two functions will simplify the study of the long-run equilibrium. Under (7)-(9), both
∗( ) ≡ max
(;)
 
∗() ≡ argmax

(;)
 (27)
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are continuous and strictly decreasing functions of  and . Since the value of ∗ at ¯ equals , the
Lagrange multiplier ¯ is uniquely determined by the cutoﬀ condition
∗(¯ ¯) =  (28)
Consequently, there is a one-to-one relationship between the cutoﬀ cost and the Lagrange multiplier.
Moreover, the corresponding function ¯(¯) is strictly decreasing due to the fact that ∗( ) decreases
with  as well as with .
Firms are assumed to be risk-neutral. Thus, firms enter the market until expected profits net of entry
costs  become zero:
E[Π()] = 
Z ¯
0
∙
∗( )− 
¸
()d−  = 0 (29)
A long-run equilibrium is defined by the bundle (¯ ¯ ¯  (¯ ¯)0≤≤¯), which are respectively the
marginal utility of income, the cutoﬀ cost, the mass of entrants, the per capita consumption and the price
of each type -variety. They are defined by the following five conditions:
(i) the consumer equilibrium condition (23);
(ii) the type- firm equilibrium condition (24);
(iii) the cutoﬀ condition (28);
(iv) the free-entry condition (29);
(v) the labor market clearing condition:4

∙
 +
Z ¯
0
(∗()() + )d
¸
= 
Since both ∗( ) and ¯() decrease with , the left-hand side of (29) also decreases because both the
integrand and the upper bound of the integral decrease. This implies that, regardless of the distribution
Γ() there exists at most one equilibrium cutoﬀ cost ¯.5
Impact of market size. As in the homogeneous case, the equilibrium equations can be studied
sequentially by diﬀerentiating the free-entry and cutoﬀ conditions. We show in Appendix E that the mar-
ginal utility of income always increases with , whereas the cutoﬀ cost decreases (increases) with market
size under increasing (decreasing) RLV, thus leading to an increase (decrease) in aggregate productivity.
Indeed, recall that market size has no impact on aggregate productivity in the Melitz-CES case. By
4The last condition is equivalent to the budget constraint under (29).
5Thus, to guarantee uniqueness of the cutoﬀ, we do not need the suﬃcient coundition given by Melitz (2003) in his
footnote 15.
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contrast, when the market mimics pro-competitive behavior, as in the homogeneous case a larger market
makes competition tougher, which triggers the exit of the least productive firms. This leads to consumers’
reallocation among more productive firms, thereby increasing aggregate productivity. On the contrary,
in the anti-competitive case, a larger market softens competition, which allows less productive firms to
enter, thus decreasing aggregate productivity. It is worth stressing that, as long as the cutoﬀ exists, these
results are independent from the distribution of firms’ productivity.6
Consider now the impact of a larger market size on prices. Since () is strictly decreasing in  and
 strictly increasing in  (see Appendix E), it follows from (25) that ¯ decreases with  for all   ¯.
Therefore, (24) implies that, in the pro-competitive case, ¯() decreases for all type- firms that remain
in business. Hence, a larger market leads to lower prices and markups because for each type- firm the
elasticity of substitution among type- varieties decreases, as in the case of homogenous firms. Moreover,
since ¯  0 in the pro-competitive case, the average price defined by
P¯ ≡ 1Γ(¯)
Z ¯
0
¯dΓ()
decreases because both the integrand and the upper limit of the integral decrease. Furthermore, since
average profits are equal to Γ(¯), they increase with . This does not imply that all operating firms
earn higher profits in a larger economy. Indeed, using (E.2) and (E.3) in Appendix E, the elasticity of
∗( ) with respect to  can be expressed as follows;
E∗() = 1− ˆ() ·
R ¯
0 ∗( )()dR ¯
0 ∗( )ˆ()()d
where ˆ() ≡ (∗()) is increasing in  in the pro-competitive case. Therefore, if  is suﬃciently low,
E∗()  0, meaning that these firms’ profits increase with market size. By contrast, when  is close to
¯, we have E∗()  0 and thus the corresponding firms’ profits decrease with market size. However,
the winners gain more than the losers because average profits increase.
The opposite properties hold in the anti-competitive case. In the CES case, it is readily verified that
E∗() = 0. Consequently, we have:
Proposition 6 When firms are heterogeneous in cost, the long-run equilibrium cutoﬀ cost and prices
6When the RLV increases, this provides an answer to Melitz web-appendix in which he questions the prediction of his
model that says that aggregate productivity does not vary with market size. To obviate this diﬃculty, Melitz assumes that
the elasticity of substitution among varieties is bigger when the market opens to trade than under autarky. Our approach
explains why and when this arises.
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vary with the relative market size as follows:
0()  0 0() = 0 0()  0
E¯˜ ≡ ¯ ¯ ↓ : −1  E¯˜  0  : E¯˜ = 0 ↑ : 0  E¯˜ 
(¯)
1−(¯)
E¯˜ ≡ ¯ ¯ ∀ ≤ ¯ ↓ : E¯˜  0  : E¯˜ = 0 ↑ : 0  E¯˜
This proposition shows that the distinction between the pro- and anti-competitive cases made above
for homogeneous firms keeps its relevance when firms are heterogeneous in cost and quality. Specifically,
the way ¯ and ¯ change with market size depends on the behavior of the RLV only. The CES is again
a borderline case because the same variables are unaﬀected by market size. Furthermore, it is worth
stressing that the way the market size impacts on the cutoﬀ cost and prices holds true in the multi-sector
economy such as the one described in Section 3 because the corresponding properties do not rely on labor
market clearing. Moreover, when the market mimics pro-competitive behavior, our analysis replicates the
main results of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) in a general equilibrium context. However, unlike them, our
analysis also highlights the conditions under which their results do not hold.
Last, one may wonder how the equilibrium mass of entrants, ¯ , and the mass of operating firms,
Γ(¯)¯ , vary with market size. We have been able to prove that ¯ increases with  in the pro-competitive
case, while Γ(¯)¯ increases in the anti-competitive case. Simulations suggest that ¯ and Γ(¯)¯ both
increase with  in the pro- and anti-competitive cases. We oﬀer the conjecture that these results hold for
“well-behaved” distributions.
4.3 Quality heterogeneity
In the real world, firms are heterogeneous along several lines. In particular, they incur higher marginal
cost when they supply higher-quality varieties. Following the same approach as above, we denote by
 the quality index drawn from a distribution Ψ() with  ≥ 0. The ranking 2  1 means that the
consumption of variety 2 yields a higher utility than the consumption of the same quantity of variety
1. We capture this idea by considering that utility of consuming  units of variety  is given by ().
Because  is strictly increasing and concave, for any fixed consumption level the utility increases with  at
a decreasing rate. Therefore, preferences now encapsulate both horizontally and vertically diﬀerentiated
attributes:
max()
U ≡
Z

()dΨ() s.t.
Z

dΨ() = 1
where  is the (endogenous) range of available varieties. Unlike the CES encapsulating similar quality-
shifter (Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011), our specification of preferences allows for diﬀerent elasticities of
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substitution between varieties having diﬀerent qualities.
Consumers’ equilibrium conditions (23) become
() = 0()
Unlike in the above, we assume that firms know their type  prior to entry. Let () be the marginal
production cost of a type -variety, which increases with the quality , with (0) = 0. The operating
profit of a firm producing a type -variety is given by
(;) =
∙0()
 − ()
¸
 =
∙0()
 −
()

¸

Repeating the argument of Section 4.1 yields the equilibrium condition:
¯ = ()[1−  (¯)] =
()
1− ¯() ∀ ∈ ¯ (30)
where
() = ()
can be interpreted as the quality-adjusted marginal cost. In this case, 1() can be interpreted as the
measure of type -firms’ eﬃciency. In (30), () plays exactly the same role as firms’ marginal cost does
in the previous sections and thus our findings hold true where ¯ = (¯). By contrast, the uniqueness
of the quality cutoﬀ ¯ requires () to be a monotone function of . Two cases may arise. First, when
() increases with , which means that () increases more than proportionally with quality , the
quality-adjusted cost and the quality rankings are the same, then only the firms oﬀering a quality smaller
than or equal to the cut oﬀ ¯ are in business (¯ = [0 ¯]). In other words, when () is strictly convex,
the high-quality varieties have too high prices for the corresponding firms to survive. Second, when ()
increases less than proportionally with quality , only the varieties whose quality exceeds ¯ are available
(¯ = [¯∞)). Stated diﬀerently, when () is strictly concave, the low-quality firms are unable to price
their variety at a suﬃciently low price to break even. When () is neither convex nor concave, there can
be more than one quality cutoﬀ. For example, when () is inverted U-shaped, only high- and low-quality
varieties are available.7
Firms’ pricing rules now depend on the interaction between the RLV and the quality-adjusted cost.
7The selection of qualities is reminiscent of what is observed in oligopolistic models of vertical diﬀerentiation (see Chapter
8 in Anderson et al. 1992).
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Indeed, high quality goods may be associated with higher or lower markups depending on the assumptions
made on  and (). Specifically, we readily verify that the following results hold.
Proposition 7 When firms are heterogeneous in cost and quality, we have:
0()  0 0() = 0 0()  0
0()  0 ↓ ¯() ↓ : E¯()˜  0  : E¯()˜ = 0 ↑ ¯() ↑ : E¯()˜  0
⇒ ¯ = [0 ¯] ↓ : E¯˜  0 ↓ : E¯˜  0  : E¯˜ = E¯˜ = 0 ↑ : E¯˜  0 ↑ : E¯˜  0
0()  0 ↑ ¯() ↓ : E¯()˜  0  : E¯()˜ = 0 ↓ : ¯() ↑ : E¯()˜  0
⇒ ¯ = [¯+∞) ↑ : E¯˜  0 ↓ : E¯˜  0  : E¯˜ = E¯˜ = 0 ↓ : E¯˜  0 ↑ : E¯˜  0
In words, when () is strictly convex (concave), firms with higher (lower) quality charge lower
(higher) markups in the pro-competitive case, but higher (lower) markups when the market mimics anti-
competitive behavior. Moreover, the cutoﬀ quality decreases (increases) with market size in the pro-
(anti-) competitive case because tougher (softer) competition drives high-quality varieties out of busi-
ness (invites low-quality varieties). The average eﬃciency corrected for quality does not depend on
the concavity/convexity of (). It always increases in the pro-competitive case, and decreases in the
anti-competitive one. Last, observe that the impact of market size on markups is the same as in the
homogeneous case.
Among other things, the above proposition does not support the widely spread idea that developed
countries should necessarily aim to produce high-quality products to insulate their workers from compet-
ition with emerging countries. Our results show that a high quality is not suﬃcient to endow firms with
a strong competitive advantage. What matters for them to survive on the international marketplace is
the level of their quality-adjusted cost within the product range.
5 Non-additive preferences
It is natural to ask whether our approach may comply with non-additive preferences. In what follows,
we consider the quadratic utility in the homogeneous case (Ottaviano et al., 2002; Melitz and Ottaviano,
2008). The utility of variety  is given by
(X) =  − 
2
2 − X (31)
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where  is a positive parameter measuring the substitutability between variety  and any other variety ,
while
X ≡
Z 
0
d
denotes the total consumption of the diﬀerentiated product. The assumption of non-additive preferences
is reflected by the fact that the utility derived from consuming variety  is shifted downward according
to the total consumption of the diﬀerentiated good. Moreover, the RLV is also shifted downward when
varieties become more diﬀerentiated. In this event, consumers display a weaker love for variety. To ease
the burden of notation, we set  = 1.
Applying the first-order conditions for utility maximization yield the individual inverse demand func-
tions:
(X) = 1−  −X
where  is again the marginal utility of income. Compared to (4), the inverse demand for a variety now
depends on two aggregate statistics, that is,  and X. The latter aggregate statistic accounts for variety
demand linkages that are not taken into account by general additive preferences.
Since the impact of  on X is negligible, we have
 = 
1−  −X
which increases with . This suggests that quadratic preferences generate pro-competitive behaviors. To
check it, consider a symmetric outcome with  =  and X =. In this event, the market price must
solve the following quadratic equation:
 = + − ( +)
which has two real roots. The larger root exceeds  whereas the other is smaller than . Therefore, the
short-run equilibrium price is unique and given by
¯1() = (1 + ) + 2 +
p
(1− )22 + 4 + 42
2 
Diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to  shows that the market price decreases with  . It remains
to determine the equilibrium mass of firms in the long run. It follows from (17) that ¯() = ˜. Since
¯() decreases with  , it must that ¯ increases with ˜. As a result, a one-sector economy in which
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consumers are endowed with quadratic preferences behaves like a pro-competitive economy such as those
described in Section 2.
Alternately, the equilibrium price ¯1() can be obtained by using the following extension of additive
preferences in which the subutility now depends on the mass of available varieties:
U ≡
Z 
0
˜( )d (32)
where
˜() ≡ 1− [1− ( +)] 2++
is strictly increasing and concave in  over [0 1( +)). Using (32), we can repeat mutatis mutandis
the arguments of Sections 2.2. and derive ¯1() as in Proposition 1. This suggests that preferences (32)
can be used to cope with interactions across varieties similar to those encapsulated in the quadratic utility
(31). Another example of non-additive preferences is provided by Benassy (1996) where ˜() =  ,
 being a constant that exceeds −1( − 1).
The foregoing discussion is reminiscent of what we know from the two-sector model of Section 3 in
which (31) is nested into a quasi-linear upper-tier utility. In this case, there is no income eﬀect, thereby
implying that  = 1. The inverse demand then becomes
( ) = 1−  −X
so that
¯2() = 
2 + +
 +
2 + 
which also decreases with  since  must be smaller than 1 for consumers to purchase the diﬀerentiated
product. Note that ¯1()  ¯2(), the reason being that firms producing the diﬀerentiated good compete
with the producers of the homogeneous good in the two-sector setting.
The whole analysis developed above applies mutatis mutandis to the symmetric translog utility studied
by Feenstra (2003). All of this suggests that the assumption of additive preferences might not be as
restrictive as it looks like at first glance.
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6 Concluding remarks
Our purpose was to develop a general, but tractable, model of monopolistic competition which obviates the
shortcoming of the CES discussed in the introduction. This new model encompasses features of oligopoly
theory, while retaining most of the flexibility of the CES model of monopolistic competition. Thus, we
find it fair to say that our model builds a link between the two main approaches to imperfect competition.
Moreover, without having the explicit solution for the equilibrium outcome, we have been able to provide
a full characterization of the market equilibrium and to derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
the market to mimic pro- and anti-competitive behaviors under well-behaved utility functions. That the
market outcome is characterized through necessary and suﬃcient conditions on preferences implies that it
becomes possible to check the full economic consistency between assumptions made in empirical models
and the results obtained after estimation. More importantly, perhaps, our analysis shows that relatively
minor changes in the specification of utility may result in opposite predictions, thus highlighting the need
to be careful in the use of specific functional forms.
We would be the last to claim that using the CES is a defective research strategy. Valuable theoretical
insights may be derived from this model by taking advantage of its various specificities. However, having
shown how peculiar are the results obtained under a CES utility, it is our contention that a “theory”
cannot be built on this model. Things are more problematic for empirical studies. Indeed, the CES being
a borderline case, using this framework is unlikely to permit (quasi-) structural estimations. The use of
alternative and richer specifications of preferences therefore should rank high on the research agenda of
both theorists and empirical economists.
Our approach can serve as a basis to several extensions. First, preliminary analysis shows that the
monopolistically competitive equilibrium of Section 2 is the limit of oligopolistic economies in which
firms compete either in quantity (Cournot) or prices (Bertrand) when  becomes arbitrarily large. This
provides a partial reconciliation of the two alternative approaches used in oligopoly theory in the case
of large economies. Second, our approach should allow one to develop new trade theories in a non-CES
world. In particular, one of the most problematic results obtained under the CES is that the pass-on
equals trade costs. Zhelobodko et al. (2010) show that international pricing involves dumping (reverse
dumping) when the RLV is increasing (decreasing), showing once more the relevance of the RLV in the
study of imperfect markets. Last, although our modeling approach can cope with several MC-sectors,
more work is called for to understand better the nature of interactions across such sectors.
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Appendix
A. Existence and uniqueness of a short-run equilibrium
Existence. Set  ≡ 1. The function () ≡ 1−  − () is negative at  = 1 and positive at
 = 0 by (9). Therefore, since () is continuous, () = 0 has at least one positive solution.
Uniqueness. We show that 0() = − − 0 () is negative at any solution to () = 0.
Multiplying 0() by  and using the condition () = 0, we get
0() =  ()− 1− 0 () 
Since
0 ≡ (1 +  − 0)
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holds for all , it follows from (8) that
1−  + 0 = 1 + 2 − 0  (1− )2 ≥ 0 (A.1)
Evaluating (A.1) at  =  , we obtain 0()  0 at any solution to () = 0, which implies that the
solution is unique.
B. The impact of market size and cost on consumption and production
Consumption. Diﬀerentiating (15) and using (19), we get the elasticity
E¯˜ ≡ ˜¯
¯
˜ =

¯
¯
 = E¯ = −1−
1
1− ¯ E¯˜  0
Since E¯˜  ¯ − 1, we have E¯˜  −1. The equilibrium consumption of each variety thus decreases
with ˜ and with  regardless of the sign of 0. These eﬀects are similar to those obtained under the CES.
Production. Recall that a firm’s production is given by ¯ = ¯. Thus, the elasticities of ¯ with
respect to  and  are the same. Note that the sign is a priori undetermined because ¯ decreases with .
However, since
E¯ ≡ ¯
¯
 = 1 + E¯˜ = −
1
1− ¯ E¯
and since E¯˜ = E¯, it must be that ¯ and ¯ have opposite signs.
The impact of marginal cost. When the marginal cost increases, everything else being equal,
operating profits are lower so that the economy accommodates fewer firms. However, when 0  0, a
smaller mass of firms leads to a higher market price. Therefore, the impact of an increase in  generates
two opposite eﬀects. In order to determine the global impact, we rewrite the equilibrium markup as
follows
¯() = 
1− ¯() 
Using (19), this implies
E¯ ≡ ¯
¯
 = 1 +
¯
1− ¯

¯
¯
  1− ¯  0
Consequently, the market price always increases with the marginal cost, regardless of the sign of 0.
However, the elasticity of ¯ with respect to  depends on the sign of 0. Indeed, if 0  0, we have
¯˜  0. In this case, the above expression implies that 1  (¯)(¯)  1 − ¯ . Thus, each
firm absorbs some fraction of the cost increase. On the other hand, if 0  0, we have (¯)(¯)  1,
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meaning that a higher marginal cost leads to a more than proportional increase in market price.
To determine the impact of  on the mass of firms, we diﬀerentiate ¯() =  ˜¯() with respect to
, use (20), and get
E¯ ≡ ¯
¯
 =
˜
¯
¯
˜ = E¯˜ = E¯
Thus, when  rises, the equilibrium mass of firms may go up or down. Specifically, when 0  0, the
equilibrium price decreases with ˜, which together with (19) imply
−(1− ¯)  E¯  0
whereas we have E¯  0 when 0  0. Note that, for 0 = 0, an increase or a decrease in the marginal
cost has no impact on the equilibrium mass of firms.
C. Properties of the expenditure function in the two-sector economy
The following two lemmas allow one to rationalize the assumption (22) made in Proposition 4.
Set
 ≡  0011 ·
¡0¢2 − 2 00120 +  0022 +  0100
Lemma 1 If  0021 ≥ 0, then the elasticity of  w.r.t.  is such that

 ·

 − 1 =
− 00110 +  0021 ( + 0)−  0022
 ≤ 0
Recall that  = 0 denotes the elasticity of the lower-tier utility .
Lemma 2 If  0021 ≥ 0 and the inequality
1− ()
() ≤
 0021( )
 02( ) −
 0011( )
 01( ) (C.1)
hold at a symmetric outcome, then the elasticity of  w.r.t.  is such that
−1 ≤  ·

 − 1 =
 010 +  00210 − 0022
 ≤ 0 (C.2)
Remark 1. In the special case of a Cobb-Douglas upper utility, the right-hand side of (C.1) is 1 so
that this condition boils down to
1 ≤ () + ()
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which holds for many functions , including the CES where () = 1−  and () = .
Remark 2. Under (0) = 0, the indirect utility function
() = 
µ 

¶
is homogeneous of degree 0 w.r.t. () and of degree 1 w.r.t. (). Therefore, 0 and 0 are
homogeneous of degree −1 w.r.t. () and of degree 0 w.r.t. (). Finally, we have 00  0.
Before proceeding, recall that the first-order condition for the upper-tier utility maximization (21) is
given by
 01(() 1−)0()−  02(() 1−) = 0 (C.3)
while the second-order condition is given by
  0
Note that ((  ) 1−) is concave w.r.t.  because  is concave while the concavity of  implies
that of .
Proof of Lemma 1. Diﬀerentiating (C.3) w.r.t.  and solving for  , we get

 = −
 001100 +  0100 −  00210
 = −
( 00110 −  0021)0 +  0100
 
Consequently,

 ·

 − 1 = −
( 00110 −  0021)0 +  0100
 − 1 =
− 0011
h
00 + (0)2
i
+  0021 (0 + 20)−  01 (00 +00)− 0022
 
Applying the Euler theorem to  and 0, we obtain the following equalities:
− 0011
h
00 +
¡0¢2i = − 00110 ¡0 +0¢ = − 00110
 0021
¡0 + 20¢ =  0021 ¡ +0¢
− 01
¡00 +00¢ = 0
As a result, we have:

 ·

 − 1 =
− 00110 +  0021 ( +0)− 0022
 
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Since  0021 ≥ 0, the numerator of this expression is positive. Since   0, we have

 ·

 − 1 ≤ 0
Proof of Lemma 2. Diﬀerentiating (C.3) w.r.t.  and solving for , we get

 =
− 001100 −  0100 +  00210
  (C.4)
which implies

 ·

 − 1 = 
− 001100 −  0100 +  00210
 − 1
=
− 0011
h
00 + (0)2
i
−  01
³
00 +00
´
+  0021
¡0 + 20¢− 0022
 
Applying the Euler theorem to  and 0 yields
− 0011
h
00 +
¡0¢2i = − 00110 ¡0 +0¢ = 0
and
− 01
¡00 +00¢ =  010  0
Therefore,

 ·

 − 1 =
 010 +  00210 − 0022
 ≤ 0
since  0021 ≥ 0 Consequently, the right inequality of (C.2) is proven.
To show that   0, we rewrite (C.4) as follows:

 =
0

Ã
− 00110 −  01
00
0 + 
00
21
!
 (C.5)
By definition of , we have
0 = −
0
2  0 
0 =
0
 
00 = −
0
2 −
00
3 
Since 0  0, the sign of  is the same as that of the bracketed term of (C.5). Substituting these
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expressions into (C.5) leads to
− 00110 −  01
00
0 + 
00
21
= − 0011
0
 − 
0
1
− 02 − 
00
3
−02
+  0021
= −
0
1

∙µ 0011
 01 −
 0021
 02
¶ 0
 + 1 +
00
0
¸

Using − 01  0 and  010() =  020, it follows from (C.1) thatµ 0011
 01 −
 0021
 02
¶ 0
 + 1 +
00
0  0 =⇒

  0
which implies the left inequality of (C.2).
D. The impact of market size on the mass of firms in the two-sector economy
We show that the equilibrium mass of firms decreases with the market size  (see Proposition 5). To this
end, we exploit the following implicit relationship between ¯ and :
 = ¯()(¯() )
Diﬀerentiating this expression w.r.t. , we get

 ·

 = 1 +
¯


¯ +


¯

¯


¯ +








which implies

 ·


µ
1− 


¶
= 1 +
µ
1 +


¯

¯
1− ¯
¶ ¯


¯ 
Using (22), we obtain

 ·


µ
1− 


¶
≥ 1 +
µ
1 +


¯

¯
1− ¯
¶
(¯ − 1)
= ¯
µ
1− 
¯

¶
 0
which implies

 ·

  0
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E. The impact of market size when firms are heterogeneous
Let E∗ and E∗ be the elasticities of ∗( ) w.r.t.  and , respectively. Diﬀerentiating (27) and
using the envelope theorem, we obtain
∗( )
 = −
∗()
Hence, we have
E∗ =
−∗()
[∗( )− ]∗() =
−

1−(∗()) − 
= 1− (∗()) ≡ 1− ˆ()  0 (E.1)
Furthermore, applying the envelop theorem to
∗( ) =
∙0(∗())
 − 
¸
∗()
yields
∗( )
 = −
0(∗())
2 
∗()
which leads to
E∗ = − 1(∗()) = −(
∗()) ≡ −ˆ()  0 (E.2)
Impact of market size on the marginal utility of income. To see how the marginal utility
of income changes with , we divide the free-entry condition (29) by  and diﬀerentiate the resulting
expression w.r.t. :


Z ¯
0
∗( )
 ()d+
∙
∗(¯ )− 
¸ ¯
 = −
Γ(¯)
2 −

2 = −
R ¯
0 ∗( )()d
  0
where ∗(¯ )−  = 0 so that the derivative of ¯ can be neglected. Rewriting this expression in terms
of elasticities and using (E.2), the elasticity E can be rewritten as follows:
E = −
R ¯
0 ∗( )()dR ¯
0 
∗()
 ()d
= −
R ¯
0 ∗( )()dR ¯
0 ∗( )E∗()d
=
R ¯
0 ∗( )()dR ¯
0 ∗( )ˆ()()d
(E.3)
which takes on values between 0 and 1.
Impact of market size on the cutoﬀ cost. Diﬀerentiating the cutoﬀ condition (28) w.r.t. :
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

∗(¯ ) = 
∗(¯ )
¯
¯
 +
∗(¯ )


 = −

2 
Rewriting this expression in terms of elasticities and using (E.1) and (E.2), we obtain
¯

∗(¯ )
¯ [1− ˆ(¯)]−


∗(¯ )
 ˆ(¯) = −

2 = −
∗(¯ )
 
Denoting the elasticity of the cutoﬀ cost w.r.t.  as E¯, we get:
E¯ · [1− ˆ(¯)]− Eˆ(¯) = −1
and thus
E¯ =
1− Eˆ(¯)
ˆ(¯)− 1 
Plugging (E.3), we obtain:
E¯ =
1− ˆ(¯)
 ¯
0 ∗()()d ¯
0 ∗()ˆ()()d
ˆ(¯)− 1  (E.4)
Since the denominator of this expression is positive, the sign of elasticity is positive if and only the second
term of the numerator is smaller than 1. In the pro-competitive case, we know that () decreases.
Therefore, ˆ()  ˆ(¯) for all   ¯ because ∗() is decreasing. The second term of the numerator is
then larger than 1, and E¯  0. Similarly, E¯  0 in the anti-competitive case, while E¯ = 0 in the
CES.
Furthermore, we have the following bounds on E¯:
−1  E¯  1ˆ(¯)− 1 
It follows from (E.4) that
E¯ · [ˆ(¯)− 1]− 1  0
It remains to show that E¯ is bigger than −1, i.e. E¯ + 1  0. Indeed, adding 1 on both sides of (E.4)
and rearranging terms yields
ˆ(¯)
"
1−
R ¯
0 ∗( )()dR ¯
0 ∗( )ˆ()()d
#
(ˆ(¯)− 1)  0
because ˆ  1.
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